State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from November 18, 1999 by New York State Public Employment Relations Board
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Board Decisions - NYS PERB New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
11-18-1999 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions 
from November 18, 1999 
New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Board Decisions - NYS PERB by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from November 
18, 1999 
Keywords 
NY, NYS, New York State, PERB, Public Employment Relations Board, board decisions, labor disputes, 
labor relations 
Comments 
This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, 
Cornell University. The information provided is for noncommercial educational use only. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions/443 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS UNION, COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, 
AFL-CTO, ^ 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19864 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH), 
Respondent. 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York (Department 
of Health) (State) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper 
practice charge filed by the New York State Law Enforcement Officers Union, 
Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Council 82).1 Council 82 charged that the State 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
1After the hearing in this case, the New York State Correctional Officers Police 
Benevolent Association (NYSCOPBA) succeeded Council 82 as the bargaining agent 
for employees of the State in the security services unit. State of New York, 32 PERB 
1J3000.21 (1999). 
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unilaterally reassigned the duties of Chief Safety/Security Officer (Chief Safety Officer) 
at St. Albans Veterans Home2 to Phoenix Security, Inc. (Phoenix), a private company, 
and failed to negotiate, upon demand, the impact of the decision to subcontract the at-
issuework. 
~The~ALJ_dismissed theimproperpracticechargeinsofar asitralleged1:hat the-
State violated the Act by unilaterally reassigning unit work to Phoenix, on the basis of 
her finding that Council 82 lacked exclusivity over the duties of the Chief Safety Officer 
at St. Albans.3 However, the ALJ found that the State violated the Act when it refused 
Council 82's demands to negotiate the impact of the transfer of unit work. 
The State excepts to the ALJ's decision on both procedural and substantive 
grounds. The State argues that the ALJ erred in determining that PERB had jurisdiction 
over the charge, in not crediting the entire testimony of a witness, in determining that 
the work at St. Albans was distinguishable from security services at other State 
facilities, and in finding that the State refused to negotiate impact on demand. Neither 
Council 82 nor NYSCOPBA has filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision or a response to 
the State's exceptions. 
2St. Albans is a State facility operated by the Department of Health to provide 
r o o i r l a n + i o ! o H I I a r l n i i r o i n n r o r a fr» w o f o r a n o anrl t h a i r r l a n o n r l o n t e 
I U O I U U 1 I U U I O i M U U U I I U I O I I I U U U I V/ LW V V / I V I U I I ^ U l I U U 1V / I I U ^ U V I l \ J U I I L U . 
3See Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 18 PERB P083 (1985), where we held that 
the initial essential questions in a unilateral transfer of unit work case are whether the 
work has been performed by unit employees exclusively and whether the transferred 
work is substantially similar to the work previously performed by unit employees. 
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Prior to the hearing in this matter, the State moved to defer the charge to the 
parties' contractual grievance procedure. The basis of the State's argument was that 
the subject matter of the charge was covered by §25.8 of the 1995-1999 collective 
bargaining agreement between Council 82 and the State, which follows: 
-Tire-Employer shall notcontract out for goodsand services — 
performed by employees which will result in any employee 
being reduced or laid off without prior consultation with the 
Union concerning any possible effect on the terms and 
conditions of employment of employees covered by this 
Agreement. 
Council 82 had not filed a grievance alleging a violation of §25.8 by the State. The ALJ 
declined to defer the charge as the State did not agree to waive objections to the : 
timeliness of a grievance filed by Council 82.4 The ALJ then determined that PERB had 
jurisdiction over the charge because §25.8 of the contract was not a reasonably 
arguable source of right to Council 82.5 
The State excepts to the ALJ's denial of its motion to defer the instant charge 
and the finding that PERB has jurisdiction over this matter, arguing that it was error to 
decide the jurisdiction issue before the hearing and arguing that the ALJ misapplied 
PERB precedent in reaching her decision. On the basis of our review of the record and 
consideration of the State's arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision on deferral and 
4The ALJ relied upon our decision in Town of Carmo!, 29 PERB ^{3073 (1996), 
where we held that a charging party may move to reopen a charge that has been 
jurisdictionally deferred if the employer successfully raises in arbitration any argument 
which forecloses a decision on the merits of the grievance. 
5See County of Nassau, 23 PERB 1J3051 (1990). 
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jurisdiction. We have had an opportunity to review §25.8 of the Council 82 - State : 
contract before. In State of New York (Department of Correctional Sen/ices) (hereafter, 
DOCS),6 we determined that the at-issue clause was not a reasonably arguable source 
of right to Council 82 and did not, therefore, divest us of jurisdiction. The State did not 
present any evidence^hatwouldwarrant acontrary finding here: '~T—'-• 
However, while we determined in DOCS that the clause was not a waiver of • 
Council 82's right to negotiate the transfer of its unit work to other nonunit State 
employees, we did note that §25.8 was a source of right to the State to contract out to a 
third party services previously performed by unit employees. The State argues here that 
the clause, therefore, divests us of jurisdiction. The State misapplies our decisions on 
jurisdiction. That a contract covers a topic or is a source of right to an employer does 
not divest us of jurisdiction, although such a clause might evidence duty satisfaction, or 
waiver. In County of Nassau,7 we clarified the difference between lack of jurisdiction 
and waiver: 
[Ujnless the agreement is a reasonably arguable source of 
right to the charging party with respect to the same subject 
matter as the improper practice charge, no contract violation 
may be established, and our jurisdiction is clear. That an 
agreement may "cover" the issue raised in an improper 
practice charge is not enough to divest PERB of jurisdiction 
over that charge pursuant to §205.5(d) Act [sic]. Of course, if 
the agreement is a source of right to the employer, an issue 
of waiver of the right to negotiate may be presented. 
However, waiver of the right to negotiate is a matter which 
627 PERB P055 (1994). 
1
 Supra, note 5, at 3108 (1990). 
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necessarily lies within PERB's jurisdiction. A determination 
whether a party has waived the right to negotiate an issue 
goes to the disposition of the charge on its merits, but not to 
PERB's power to reach those merits. 
Here, the State raised waiver as a defense to the charge. However, the ALJ 
dismissed the charge without deciding the State's waiver defense. We consider this 
defense raised by the State and find, as we did in DOCS, that §25.8 of the State-
Council 82 contract satisfies the State's duty to negotiate with Council 82 the 
subcontracting of unit work to a third party. The charge, insofar as it alleges the State 
violated §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act by unilaterally subcontracting the work of the Chief 
Security Officer at St. Albans to Phoenix, must, therefore, be dismissed. 
Based upon our finding as to duty satisfaction, we do not reach the State's other 
exceptions related to the decision to subcontract. However, the State also excepts to 
the ALJ's finding that it violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act when it refused to negotiate upon 
demand the impact of its decision to subcontract. The State first argues that it agreed to 
meet with Council 82 to allow it to demonstrate that its decision to subcontract the 
duties of the Chief Security Officer to Phoenix had impacted mandatory subjects of 
negotiation. However, the record shows that the offer to meet and discuss the issue of 
impact was not made by the State until after the instant charge had been filed. The 
State's willingness to negotiate impact after the improper practice charge was filed 
would not preclude a finding that it refused to negotiate pursuant to the demand, it 
would only affect the remedy to be ordered.8 
8See Eastchester Union Free Sen. Dist, 15 PERB P086 (1982). 
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It is undisputed that the State did not respond to Council 82's demand to 
negotiate the impact of the decision to subcontract in a timely fashion and that even 
when it did, it conditioned impact negotiations on Council 82 first establishing to the 
State's satisfaction that there had been an impact. The duty to negotiate impact is not 
dischargedby conditioninga^willingnesstomeet upon thebargaining agent's priorproof 
of impact.9 
However, "[l]ike all bargaining obligations,...an employer's duty to negotiate the 
mandatorily negotiable effects of its managerial decisions can be satisfied."10 Section 
25.8 of the contract between Council 82 and the State clearly states the parties' intent 
to consult "concerning any possible effect [of subcontracting] on the terms and 
\ conditions of employment of employees covered by this Agreement." The State's duty 
to meet and discuss the effects of its decision to subcontract to Phoenix is fixed by the 
terms of §25.8 of the contract. The State's failure to negotiate impact, therefore, may 
violate this contract provision but, by the parties' own agreement, it does not violate the 
Act.11 The ALJ's finding that the State violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act by refusing to 
negotiate impact upon demand must, therefore, be reversed. 
9North Babylon Union Free Sch. Dist, 7 PERB 1J4512, aff'd, 7 PERB 1J3027 
(1974). See also City of Newburgh, 15 PERB H4624, affd, 15 PERB 1J3116 (1982), 
cont'd on other grounds, 97 A.D.2d 258, 16 PERB 1J7030 (3d Dep't 1983), affd, 
63 N.Y.2d 793, 17 PERB ^7017 (1984). 
^County of Nassau (Police Dep't), 31 PERB 1J3064, at 3142 (1998). See also 
County of Nassau, 32 PERB 1J3052 (1999). 
11See Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist, 13 PERB 1J3014 (1980). 
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Based on the foregoing, the decision of the ALJ is affirmed, in part, for the 
reasons set forth herein and reversed, in part. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
-7 
DATEDv-November-1 M 999-
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/
 " Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GREENBURGH #11 FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
— —~ Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-19896 
GREENBURGH #11 UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JEFFREY CASSIDY, for Charging Party 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (TERENCE M. O'NEIL & HOWARD M. MILLER 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION AND ORDER 
This case comes before us at this time pursuant to a motion filed by the 
charging party, the Greenburgh # 11 Federation of Teachers (Federation), to strike 
parts of the exceptions and supporting affidavits and documents filed by the 
respondent, the Greenburgh # 11 Union Free School District (District). The District has 
filed exceptions to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the 
District violated §209-a.(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it unilaterally implemented the use of metal detectors and other security devices, 
as well as armed security guards and off-duty police officers, at grievance hearings held 
at a location not on District property. 
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The Federation argues that the affidavits filed in support of the exceptions are 
not properly before us and the anonymous letters attached to the affidavits are not part 
of the record before the ALJ. The Federation asks that we confine our review to the 
record before the ALJ. 
The District argueslhatlthadTeceived~anonymous^lettersTvhich promptedits: 
actions in instituting such stringent security measures. The District alleges that it 
sought to have the ALJ review the anonymous letters in camera, fearing that a review 
of the letters by the Federation would enable the Federation to ascertain the identity of 
the letters' authors and that retribution would follow. The District further alleges that 
when the ALJ denied its request for in camera review, the District withdrew the letters 
and any reference to them from the record before the ALJ. The District now argues that 
because of the extraordinary circumstances in this case, it should be allowed to 
introduce the letters now. The affidavits which accompany the District's exceptions are 
offered in support of the District's position. The District opposes the motion to strike. 
A motion to strike all or part of the exceptions is not authorized by our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules). Indeed, in only one other case, New York City Transit Authority,1 
have we been called upon to decide a motion to strike. There, we determined that such 
a motion should be considered in the same manner in which we consider interlocutory 
appeals from an ALJ's rulings or interim determinations.2 We held that "in the absence 
^oPERBpooecigg/). 
interlocutory appeals from ALJ rulings and other nonfinal determinations are 
heard only if the underlying issues cannot be adequately reviewed upon exceptions and 
responses to the ALJ's dispositive decision and order. 
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of a showing of substantial prejudice, we should and do defer the review of the issues 
raised by this type of motion until such time as the entire case is ready for decision."3 
We conclude that the Federation's motion to strike should be deferred as the 
Federation's arguments against acceptance of the District's affidavits and the :;, 
lanbnymous letters can beTully reviewecl as appropriate undeTthe exceptions and the 
Federation's response thereto. We therefore deny without prejudice the Federation's 
motion to strike parts of the exceptions and the accompanying affidavits and 
anonymous letters. 
The Federation is hereby granted an extension of time to file a response to the 
District's exceptions. A response to the exceptions will be deemed timely if filed and 
served within seven working days from receipt of this decision. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 18, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
/ I John T. Mitchell, Member 
3New York City Transit Auth., supra, at 3015. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MARYAM J. AYAZI, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20056 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondent, 
- and-
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
MARYAM J. AYAZI, pro se 
JAMES SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (CONRAD LOWER of counsel), 
for Respondent 
DALE C. KUTZBACH, GENERAL COUNSEL (THOMAS LIESE of counsel), 
for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Maryam J. Ayazi to a decision of 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing her improper practice charge. The 
charge alleged that the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) violated §209-a.2(c) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by failing to afford her proper ••. 
representation in several matters. Ayazi's employer, the Board of Education of the City 
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School District of the City of New York (District), is made a party to this proceeding i 
pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act.1 
Ayazi was employed by the District as a teacher of English as a Second 
Language (ESL). In February 1997, she was hired as a probationary teacher of ESL at 
Grover CreverandHighSchoolrrn^June 19977she^was"notified that her probationary 
appointment would be discontinued because of unsatisfactory performance. The UFT 
represented Ayazi at her probation discontinuance appeal hearing held on -i-'••• 
December 18, 1997. On March 31, 1998, Ayazi was notified that the probationary 
discontinuance panel had denied her appeal. 
Ayazi thereafter requested legal representation from UFT to appeal the 
determination. Peter Mayglothling, Ayazi's UFT representative, informed her on April 
22, 1998, that her appeal raised no legal issues and that the UFT was, therefore, 
unable to assist her in any such action.2 
Thereafter, Ayazi again sought full-time employment with the District and, 
beginning in January 1998, began making complaints to the UFT that she was unable 
1Section 209-a.3 of the Act provides: 
The public employer shall be made a party to any charge 
filed under [§209-a.2] which alleges that the duly recognized 
or certified employee organization breached its duty of fair 
rc i r \ rooc in+p+i r \ r» in t h o r » r r \ r » o o o i n n rvF r\r f o i l i i r o +r\ r\rr\nacG o 
I V M ' L / I U O V I I I U L I U I I I I I LI I W U l U U V ^ v J O I l I M * - " * - " I U I I U I V L\-/ k / I U U U U U *-« 
claim that the public employer has breached its agreement 
with such employee organization. 
2Ayazi brought suit in Kings County Supreme Court against the District, seeking 
judicial review of the decision of the probation discontinuance panel. 
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to obtain full-time employment with the District. Ayazi, who suffers from post-polio 
weakness, claimed to UFT that her inability to obtain such employment with the District.: 
was a result of impermissible notations in her District personnel file regarding her 
medical condition. Ayazi filed a grievance in April 1998, claiming that the District owed 
^her backrpay beginning in September 1997^  becauseofitsTefusal tohireher as a fulk ^ 
time teacher. By letter dated May 7, 1998, UFT informed Ayazi that it did not believe 
that the grievance would be successful and declined to pursue it. By his May 26, 1998 
letter, Mayglothling informed Ayazi that UFT's investigation of her complaints showed 
that the District was denying her full-time employment because of her previous 
discontinuation of employment and not because of her medical condition. He confirmed 
UFT's refusal to pursue Ayazi's salary grievance. On June 8, 1998, Ayazi filed the 
instant improper practice:charge. :\ 
By letter dated June 9, 1998, Ayazi informed UFT that she was appealing its 
decision not to pursue the salary grievance to arbitration. Ayazi claims that she was 
thereafter told by a UFT representative, George Fesko, that UFT would no longer 
represent her because she had filed an improper practice charge. In its answer, UFT 
disputed Ayazi's characterization of the conversation, alleging instead that Fesko had 
left a message for Ayazi that UFT could not discuss matters with her that were the 
subject of the improper practice charge, but that it would continue to represent her in all 
other matters. 
The conference ALJ limited the matters to be heard to seven paragraphs in 
Ayazi's July 3, 1998 amendment to the charge. The seven paragraphs are set forth 
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below: 
43) Annexed hereto as Exhibit D is a true copy of an article from 
a UFT news article confirming that they have represented 
teachers for not having had a pre-observation conference 
when they were in danger of receiving unsatisfactory ratings. 
This was the same situation charging party experienced. 
55) Shewas^advisecl thattheUFTxouid forcethecommitteeia r-
meet a second time to consider violations of ADA as a factor 
in her discontinuance. 
56) She was told that legal representation would be provided her 
depending on the points raised in the appeal. 
57) On February 2, 1998, charging party wrote George Fesko 
explaining that she felt she was being retaliated against by 
her employer because she still did not have a full-time 
position despite having 2 licenses in a shortage area. 
68) At this meeting George; Fesko erroneously told charging 
party that the UFT could not help her in this matter because 
employer [District] had a new policy of not hiring teachers 
with discontinuance of probationary services, despite the 
fact that many teachers in charging parties same situation f 
were working fuli-time. 
111) Annexed hereto as Exhibit N is a true copy of this letter to 
Garry Sprung which shows that she requested clarification 
on a matter. She has never received this correspondence. 
112) On June 23, 1998, George Fesko told charging party that 
she could no longer receive representation from his office as 
a result of her suit against UFT with PERB (Public 
Employment Relations Board) in violation of law. 
At the hearing, the ALJ requested that Ayazi state the basis of her charge for the 
record, limiting her remarks to the charge as limited after the conference. Ayazi then 
described her charge as alleging: (1) that she had not received legal representation 
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regarding the discontinuance of her probationary status; (2) that UFT did not represent 
her with regard to her allegations that the District had hired teachers without certification 
while she had not been rehired despite holding two.certifications, all in violation of the 
collective bargaining agreement, District regulations and provisions of the Education 
taw; (3) that UFTrlidnot represent her with respect to herallegationsihatihe District 
retaliated against her for seeking a medical accommodation and for filing an EEOC 
(Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) complaint; and (4) that UFT had 
retaliated against her for filing the instant charge. 
UFT objected to the second and third allegations, arguing that they were not 
encompassed in the charge as limited. Ayazi then made an offer of proof, at the ALJ's 
) direction, that basically realleged the points she had made in her summary-of the 
charge. UFT moved to dismiss the charge and the ALJ reserved judgement on the 
motion. After the close of the hearing, Ayazi attempted to file a third amendment to the 
original charge. The ALJ denied Ayazi's request to so amend the charge. As the motion 
did not contain any newly discovered evidence, the ALJ correctly determined not to 
accept the proffered amendment.3 
After the parties' post-hearing submissions, the ALJ dismissed the charge, 
holding that the charge did not encompass the second and third allegations Ayazi made 
at the hearing, as limited. As to the remaining allegations, the ALJ decided that the 
3See Town ofBrookhaven, 26 PERB 1J3066, at 3120 (1993), where we held that 
"[t]he decision to grant or deny an amendment to a charge is normally a matter 
i reserved to an ALJ's discretion, to be exercised consistently with basic due process 
considerations and within certain limits we have fixed by case law." (footnotes omitted) 
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; 
proof Ayazi offered at the hearing was not sufficient to support a finding that UFT -. 
breached its duty of fair representation. : 
Ayazi excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred as a matter of 
fact and law. UFT supports the ALJ's decision.4 
gaseduponiDur review of"tirerrecord andourconsiderationoHhe parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The ALJ correctly held that a violation cannot be found if it is not alleged in an 
improper practice charge or a timely amendment thereto.5 Ayazi argued that 
paragraphs 57 and 68 of the amended charge include her second allegation and that 
paragraphs 57, 68 and 111 of the charge, as amended, covers her third allegation. The 
) ALJ held that the amended charge, as limited after the conference, cannot be fairly 
read as containing the second and third allegations Ayazi raised at the hearing. 
Therefore, the ALJ dismissed the charge as to the second and third allegations, as a 
party is bound by the allegations in the charge.6 
4Ayazi sought leave to file a response to UFT's response to the exceptions, 
alleging that UFT had raised new issues in its response. Pursuant to §213.3 of our 
Rules of Procedure, such pleadings will not be requested or authorized by the Board 
unless the preceding pleading properly raises for the first time issues that are material 
to the disposition of the matter. As UFT's response does not raise any new issues : 
material to the disposition of Ayazi's charge, Ayazi's request to file a response to UFT's 
response was denied. 
5New York City Transit Auth., 31 PERB 1J3024 (1998). 
6City of Mount Vernon, 14 PERB 1J3037 (1981). 
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Turning to the remaining allegations, we have held, in deciding a motion to 
dismiss, that an ALJ is to assume the truth of all of the charging party's evidence and to 
give the charging party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from 
that evidence.7 Applying that standard, the ALJ concluded that, even giving Ayazi every 
reasonabreinferencerher o f f e r o f proof did not establish a prima facie'caser 
While Ayazi argues that the ALJ applied "too restrictive" a definition of the duty of 
fair representation, the standard the ALJ used to analyze Ayazi's case is the one set 
forth by the courts in Civil Service Employees Association v. PERB and Diaz: 
In order to establish a claim for breach of the duty of fair 
representation against a union, there must be a showing that 
the activity, or lack thereof, which formed the basis of the 
charges against the union was deliberately invidious, 
') arbitrary or founded in bad faith. 
...An honest mistake resulting from misunderstanding or lack 
of familiarity with matters of procedure does not rise to the 
level of the requisite arbitrary, discriminatory or bad-faith 
conduct required to establish an improper practice by the 
union8 
As the ALJ concluded, Ayazi's offer of proof did not set forth any facts upon which to 
make a finding that UFT's handling of the discontinuance of Ayazi's probationary 
service was in breach of its duty of fair representation. That Ayazi disagreed with UFT's 
7See State of New York (Dep't of Correctional. Servs.), 29 PERB |f3015 
(1996);County of Nassau (Police Dep't), 17 PERB p 0 1 3 (1984). 
8132 A.D.2d 430, 20 PERB 1T7024, at 7039 (3d Dep't 1987), aff'd on other 
grounds, 73 N.Y.2d 796, 21 PERB f7017 (1988). 
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position and believed that the discontinuance should have been further appealed is not 
sufficient to establish a violation of the Act.9 
Finally, as to Ayazi's claim that UFT retaliated against her for filing the instant 
improper practice charge, the ALJ found that she offered insufficient evidence in 
supportof thisallegation—Ayazi points to theallegedstatement by her UFT—" — 
representative that UFT would no longer represent her because she had filed an 
improper practice charge. UFT admitted that Ayazi was told that UFT would not 
communicate with her about matters that were the subject of this improper practice 
charge. Such a reservation, without more, does not rise to the level of a violation of the 
Act. Indeed, by Ayazi's own admission in her exceptions to the ALJ's decision, the UFT 
\ has continued to communicate with her about matters unrelated to those that are the 
subject of this proceeding. 
It is clear from Ayazi's voluminous and often repetitive pleadings and the 
attached documentation that the District gave her an unsatisfactory rating as a 
classroom teacher and that rating has resulted in her being denied any other full-time 
employment with the District. UFT has assisted her in several forums and on several 
9See Dist. Council 37, AFSCME and Bd. ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the 
City of New York (Gonzalez), 28 PERB 1J3062, at 3138 (1995), where we held: 
The dutv of fair reoresentation is breached onlv bv conduct which is 
arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. Indeed, it has been widely held -
that allegations that a union has been careless, inept, ineffective or 
negligent in the investigation and presentation of a grievance do not 
\ evidence a breach of the union's duty of fair representation. 
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occasions in her various attempts to obtain such employment. That UFT's 
representation of Ayazi has not been successful and has, at times, been denied to her 
is not a violation of the Act. As we have often held, an employee organization has no 
duty to process every grievance or to take every grievance to arbitration. It is entitled to 
a^bToad rangerof"discretionrinrdetermining which grievances it wilhpursueandto-what — 
level.10 
Based on the foregoing, Ayazi's exceptions are denied and the decision of the 
ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
^ DATED: November 18, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
J/ Marc A. 'Abbott, Member 
l/c; y±Ak 
(> Jfohn T. Mitchell, Member 
J 
wNew York State Pub. Employees Fed'n, AFL-CIO, 29 PERB P019 (1996), aff'g 
28 PERB ^4675(1995). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RIVERHEAD CENTRAL FACULTY 
ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-20514 
RIVERHEAD CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
TRICIA ALLEN, for Charging Party 
) KEVIN SEAMAN, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Riverhead Central School District (District) has filed exceptions to the 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) which found that the District violated 
§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). The ALJ held 
that the District unlawfully transferred Barbara Barosa, a teacher, from the District's 
high school to an elementary school because she exercised a right to union release 
time under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the District 
and the Riverhead Central Faculty Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (Association). 
The ALJ ordered the District to immediately reassign Barosa to her former 
\ position and to maintain that assignment in accordance with District policy and practice, 
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to make her whole for any loss of wages or benefits transfer caused, and to post a 
notice. 
The District takes exception to the ALJ's finding that the Board has jurisdiction 
over the charge because the source of the rights allegedly violated is not the CBA. It 
also-t-akes-e-xeept-ion to the Al_J-s determination thatthe transfer-was-based-on-Barosa's 
use of contractual release time, and it takes exception to the finding of a violation. The 
District argues that the record shows that it transferred Barosa because she chose to 
stop coaching athletics. In addition, the District argues, the transfer enhanced rather 
than impaired the availability of negotiated release time. According to the District, the 
Association failed to show that the District would not have transferred Barosa but for 
her alleged protected activity, while the District itself showed that it had a legitimate 
business reason for transferring her. It also takes exception to the remedy. The 
Association maintains that the ALJ's decision is correct in all respects. 
We reverse and remand this proceeding to the ALJ. 
The following evidence appears undisputed, except as noted. When the District 
transferred Barosa to the elementary school in August 1998, she had been a physical. 
education teacher at the District's high school for eighteen years. For seventeen of 
those years, she had coached at the high school, but she chose not to coach during the 
1997-98 school year, when she became president of the Association, an office she still 
holds. Although she did not coach, Barosa continued to teach at the high school during 
the 1997-98 school year. 
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In various situations before August 1998, Barosa publicly advocated the 
Association's interests and positions, often in conflict with the District's interests or 
positions, and often in the presence of, or with the knowledge of, Dr. Robert J. Holmes, 
the District's superintendent. In separate conversations on August 18, 1998, Holmes 
and^GeorgeDuffyrthehigh school buildingprincipalrtold Barosa that she^A/asbeing 
transferred to the Roanoke Elementary School to teach because she was no longer 
coaching at the high school. 
The District presented evidence at the hearing that it tries to reserve the physical 
education teaching positions at the high school for teachers who are coaching, because 
this enhances the quality of its physical education program. Holmes testified on cross-
examination that Barosa's absences "because of union duties" were a reason for the 
transfer.1 
Article III (B) of the parties' CBA provides, in relevant part: 
1. The President of the Association, if at the secondary level, will have no: 
duties, or if at the elementary level will have no duty assignment and a 
minimum of four (4) hours per week, exclusive of planning and lunch 
periods, in which to carry on Association business. . . . 
2. The President of the Association, or a designee, with permission of the 
Superintendent may use a maximum of ten hours in any month to 
investigate written grievances or to conduct Association business. 
As president of the Association, Barosa used contractual release time. 
xWe do not reach the issue of whether this evidence and testimony should be 
credited, or proves or tends to prove these alleged facts. 
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Barosa filed a pending grievance, which alleged that her transfer to the 
elementary school violated Article V of the CBA, "Teacher Assignments." The CBA 
gives certain bargaining unit members certain rights in regard to assignments, such as 
seniority rights and a right to consultation. The contractual grievance procedure ends in 
final and_bindingarbitrationr~ ~ - : 
As a preliminary matter, we affirm the ALJ's rejection of the District's argument 
that the charge should be deferred to the grievance procedure. No allegation of a 
contract violation triggers our jurisdictional deferral policies, and no contractual 
grievance implicates our merits deferral policies, unless something in the parties' 
contract gives the charging party a reasonably arguable source of contractual right with 
respect to the matter in issue under this charge,2 The District has not identified any 
contractual provision that is a reasonably arguable source of right to the Association 
with respect to the subject matter of this charge, which is the District's alleged 
interference with, and discrimination on the basis of, employee and employee 
organization rights under the Act. In addition, deferral is discretionary, and we do not 
usually defer a charge alleging a violation of only §209-a(1 )(a) and (c).3 
Turning now to the substance of the exceptions, in New York City Transit 
Authority,4 we suggested that an employer may violate the Act if it interferes with or 
2City of Utica, 31 PERB P039 (1998). 
3See Addison Cent. Sch. Dist, 17 PERB fi3076 (1984). 
423 PERB 1J3016 (1990). 
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discriminates against an employee because of the employee's exercise of a contract 
right. In County of Albany,5 which the ALJ relied on here, we did not conclusively define 
all the possible elements of such a violation of the Act, but we stated our belief "that 
such a violation requires minimally that the employee's contract right be clear and that 
the~employer'sinterferenceor discriminationbetatenTvithout colorable claim of-
corresponding right."6 
The ALJ correctly applied that standard here to the limited number of facts he 
found.7 As president of the Association, Barosa had a clear contract right to use release 
time for the union's business, and the District has advanced no colorable claim of a 
corresponding contractual right. While the District may have a contractual right to 
transfer a teacher in certain specified circumstances, which is the issue in the pending 
grievance, the District has not identified any colorable claim of a contractual right that 
corresponds to Barosa's clear right to release time. A corresponding contract right 
necessarily involves the same subject matter as the contract right at issue in a charge. 
County of Albany prescribes the minimal elements of a charge that an employer 
interfered or discriminated because an employee exercised a contractual right. It does 
525PERB 1J3026 (1992). 
6ld. at 3058. 
The ALJ received evidence regarding legitimate business reasons. Because he 
viewed the charge as based on two distinct theories of a violation of the Act, one 
involving participation in protected activities and the other action because of the use of 
contractual release time, and based his decision on only the second theory, he limited 
the scope of the determination of facts in his decision. 
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not hold, however, that any proof of the employer's legitimate business reasons for its 
conduct is irrelevant to such a charge. On the contrary, in County of Nassau* which 
cites to County of Albany, we held that when an employer acts because of an 
employee's use of contractual release time, the employer's motives are relevant and 
••can-even be dispositiveT — 
Therefore, the ALJ here erred in not considering the District's evidence of a 
legitimate business reason for transferring Barosa, in conjunction with any other 
relevant and credible evidence in the record. We reverse the finding of a violation and 
the recommended remedial order, and remand the charge to the ALJ to decide the 
charge consistent with this decision.9 
DATED: November 18, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Micba-el R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Ivlarc A.vAbbott," Member' 
John T. Mitchell, Member x 
sCounty of Nassau, 27 PERB ^3011 (1994), cont'd, 221 A.D. 2d 339, 28 PERB 
1J7014(2dDep't1995). 
9While we have considered the District's remaining exceptions, we do not reach 
them, without prejudice to the District renewing them in regard to any decision and 
order the ALJ issues pursuant to our decision here. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RONALD GRASSEL, 
:
 C hargingf Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20569 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, AND 
NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS, 
Respondents. 
GENTILE, BROTMAN AND BENJAMIN (SUSAN BROTMAN of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (JAMES J. BRADY of counsel), 
for Respondent New York State United Teachers 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION AND ORDER 
Ronald Grassel, the charging party, has filed exceptions to an interlocutory 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a motion. The charge alleges that the 
United Federation of Teachers (UFT) and New York State United Teachers (NYSUT) 
breached a duty of fair representation to Grassel when NYSUT, as UFT's agent, 
discontinued legal representation of Grassel in a disciplinary proceeding because of his 
alleged failure to cooperate. 
Board - U-20569 -2 
The ALJ's September 1, 1999 ruling granted NYSUT's motion to dismiss the 
charge as against it. The decision found that NYSUT is not the negotiating agent on 
behalf of the charging party and is not a party to any agreement between the UFT and 
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York. The ALJ 
foundlhat NYSUT therefore had nonduty under therAct to represent the^charging party 
and was not properly a respondent. 
NYSUT has filed a motion to dismiss the exceptions on the ground that the 
charging party did not timely serve them on NYSUT. 
The parties do not dispute that Grassei timely filed his exceptions with PERB on 
September 24, 1999. Neither do they dispute that the exceptions were postmarked that 
same day, but incorrectly addressed. The envelope was addressed to NYSUT's 
attorney, but bore the wrong zip code and incorrectly used "Park Avenue," instead of 
"Park Avenue South," in the street address. In opposition to the motion, Grassei asserts 
that those errors were inadvertent and did not prejudice NYSUT. When the postal 
service returned the undeliverable envelope, it was readdressed, and NYSUT received 
it on October 6, 1999. 
A party may make an interlocutory appeal from a ruling made in conjunction with 
the processing of a case only by permission under §212.4(h) of our Rules of 
Procedure.1 As a general rule, this Board will not review an Administrative Law Judge's 
1 M . Morris Cent. Sen. Dist, 26 PERB 1T3085, at 31.66 n.2 (1993). 
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interlocutory ruling before proceedings conclude.2 The purpose of that policy is to 
prevent the delay inherent in the piecemeal review of proceedings, and to prevent the 
prejudice and inefficient use of administrative resources that can result from such 
piecemeal review.3 
We^haiTe^ecognizedrhoweverrthat delayrprejudicerand inefficiencies can 
sometimes also result if we do not permit an interlocutory appeal.4 Thus, our policy is to 
entertain a request for interlocutory review when extraordinary circumstances are 
present or where severe prejudice will result if we deny interlocutory review.5 
Neither extraordinary circumstances nor the potential for severe prejudice 
appear to be present here, if we deny interlocutory review, Grassel may still attempt to 
show in this proceeding that NYSUT's alleged conduct violated a duty of fair 
representation that UFT allegedly owed him. If he prevails, the relief awarded will likely 
be substantially similar to anyrelief that would have been awarded if he had also been 
permitted to show that NYSUT's alleged conduct violated such an alleged duty of its 
own. Inany event, on the basis of our decision here, whether Grassel prevails or not, 
he does not lose his appeal to pursue a charge against NYSUT. Balancing the possible 
prejudice and inefficiencies associated with each course available to us in these unique 
2County of Nassau, 22 PERB 1J3027 (1989). 
3Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free Sch. Dist, 28 PERB p 0 3 4 (1995). 
4See, e.g., County of Nassau, supra. 
5ld. 
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circumstances, we choose, in our discretion, not to entertain this interlocutory appeal. 
Therefore, we do not reach the merits of either the motion to dismiss or the exceptions. 
The charging party's interlocutory exceptions are dismissed, without prejudice to 
his right to appeal the ALJ's ruling dismissing the charge as against NYSUT upon 
exce"ptro"ns7lf~anyrto"th^ 
proceeding. 
DATED: November 18, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
>Marc^. Abbott, Member 
(- John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, ROCKLAND 
COUNTY LO^AL~8^47TOWN~OF RAMAPO, 
UNIT 8358, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-20608 
TOWN OF RAMAPO, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (DAREN L. RYLEWICZ of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
ALAN SIMON, TOWN ATTORNEY (JACK SCHLOSS of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of Ramapo (Town) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the Town violated 
§209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
instituted a daily work log for Building, Planning and Zoning Department inspectors, 
represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, Rockland County Local 844, Town of Ramapo, Unit 8358 (CSEA). 
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The ALJ found that the unilateral implementation of a requirement that 
employees fill in a daily log of activities where none was previously required was an 
impermissible imposition of employee assistance in a managerial decision as a function 
of the employees' duties and was violative of the Act. 
Th~e~Town_exc~eptsto"tireALJ 's decisionvarguing that theALJ erredbecauseiihe 
daily work log has a greater impact on a managerial prerogative than it does on terms 
and conditions of employment, that the potential discipline component of the 
requirement is not the sole test of negotiability, that there has been no impact on the 
employees' workload, that the ALJ improperly characterized a witness' testimony and 
that the ALJ's decision is against public policy. CSEA supports the ALJ's decision, but 
argues that the Town's exceptions must not be considered as they were not filed in 
accordance with PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules). 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
Preliminarily, we consider the argument by CSEA that the Town's exceptions and 
supporting brief were not filed as separate documents as required by our Rules. While 
filed as one document, the Town's exceptions are separated from the arguments 
supporting them. Therefore, we and CSEA are reasonably able to distinguish between 
the exceptions and the arguments, thereby materially achieving the result §213.2 of the 
Board - U-20608 -3 
Rules is intended to effect. CSEA's objection to the form of the exceptions is, 
accordingly, denied.1 
It is undisputed that for at least five years before the Town implemented its daily 
work log requirement in the Building, Planning and Zoning Department, inspectors-were 
not inTlividuallyTequired torkeepranykindoflogor record ofdailyactivities^ln ^—— 
November 1998, the Director of Building, Planning and Zoning, Brian Brophy, created 
the log requirement, after the Town and CSEA had two meetings regarding the Town's 
felt need to require such recordkeeping by the inspectors. Brophy testified that he 
wanted to know where the employees were every day, the volume of work performed 
and the time required to do it so he could monitor employees' locations and workload.2 
The employer imposition of a record keeping function on unit employees where 
none previously existed violates §209-a.1(d) of the Act. As we found in Newburgh 
Enlarged City School District:3 
[An employer's] basic managerial right to maintain a record 
of attendance and presence of its employees is not in issue. 
That right exists by virtue of its accountability for the 
expenditure of public funds and for the acts of its 
employees. The maintenance of such a record by the 
1New York State Canal Corp., 30 PERB ^3070 (1997); Uniondale Union Free 
Sch. Dist, 27 PERB 1J3077 (1994). 
2These inspectors include building inspectors, assistant building inspectors, chief 
fire safety inspectors, assistant fire safety inspectors, and code enforcement officers 
who receive their daily work assignments from Brophy. The inspectors then determine 
individually the order for their inspections and schedule the inspections based upon ' 
their individual assessment of how much time each inspection will require: 
320 PERB 1J3053, at 3116-17 (1987). 
Board - U-20608 
employer is beyond the scope of mandatory negotiations. An 
employer may not, however, without agreement of the 
employees' negotiating representative, require its employees 
to participate in the recording process. Applying our usual 
balancing test, we conclude that the clear and direct primary 
impact of such a work rule is on conditions of employment 
and not upon essential managerial responsibilities.4 
The Townarguesthatithasrnointent toruserthe^daily^logsi'ordiscipline and that 
no employee has been disciplined for failing to complete the log in a timely fashion. As 
we have previously held, an employer's direction to employees to use a form to record 
attendance, work location or work activities constitutes a direction that the form be 
completed by the employee and returned to the employer. A disciplinary component 
must, therefore, be said to exist for the failure to comply with an employer work order.5 
That no disciplinary action has been taken or threatened when unit employees failed to 
submit the forms is not controlling; the possibility of discipline remains outstanding.6' 
4lt is well settled that the unilateral delegation to unit employees of the 
responsibility for employer record keeping violates the Act. See City of Schenectady, 26 
PERB 113025 (1993); Spencerport Cent. Sch. Dist, 16 PERB H3074 (1983); County of 
Nassau, 13 PERB 1J4612 (1980), exceptions dismissed, 14 PERB 1J3014 (1981), affd, 
County of Nassau v. PERB, 14 PERB fl7023 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981). See also 
Police Ass'n of New Rochelle, New York, Inc., 13 PERB fl3082 (1980). 
5See State of New York (Office of Mental Health - Cent. New York Psychiatric 
Ctr.), 31 PERB 1J3051, at 3106, where we held that "[a]ll employer directives to 
employees carry with them, at least implicitly, the possibility of an employment 
consequence for noncompliance." 
6The record reveals one instance when an inspector did not fill out a daily log. 
Brophy testified that he spoke with the employee, impressing upon him the importance 
of fulfilling the requirement. No formal discipline apparently followed. 
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The Town indeed may have a legitimate need to record assignments of work, 
location and workload. We hold only that the Town cannot meet that need by 
unilaterally imposing a record keeping responsibility on unit employees without 
negotiating the requirement with CSEA. 
Based uponthe foregoingrwe denythe^Town^exeeptions and affirm the-ALJzs 
decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Town rescind its November 1998 
directive that inspectors in its Building, Planning and Zoning Department complete a 
daily work log. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Town sign and post the attached notice in 
all locations customarily used to post notices to unit employees. 
DATED: November 18, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Z . 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
Jiohn T. Mitchell, Member 
U 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Town of Ramapo in the unit represented by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Rockland County Local 844, Town of 
Ramapo, Unit 8358 (CSEA), that the Town will forthwith rescind its. November 1998 directive that 
inspectors in its Building, Planning and Zoning Department complete a daily work log. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
Town of Ramapo 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or 
covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE SUPREME COURT OFFICERS 
ASSOCIATION, ILA, 
Charging^Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20929 
NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF COURT 
ADMINISTRATION, 
Respondent. 
KENNEDY, SCHWARTZ & CURE, P.C. (IRA CURE of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York State Supreme 
Court Officers Association, ILA (Association) to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director). The Director dismissed an 
amended improper practice charge in which the Association alleged that the New York 
State Office of Court Administration (OCA) violated §209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). Pursuant to his authority under §204.2 of 
PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules), the Director determined that the amended charge 
did not plead sufficient facts to support the alleged violation of §209-a.1(a), and that 
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PERB lacked jurisdiction over the dispute insofar as it alleged a violation of 
§209-a.1(d).1 
Our review of a determination made under §204.2 of the Rules is limited to 
whether the pleaded facts can support the alleged violation under any recognized or 
^cceptable^legartheoryrafter giving thosefacts all reasonableinferences that canbe 
drawn.2 Here, the Association's charge, as amended, states in its entirety: 
The Collective Bargaining Agreement in place between the 
union and the charging party [sic] specifies the mechanics 
for making Transfer Requests. On May 13, 1999, the 
Respondent, by Major Edward S. McLaughlin and Major 
Jewel Williams-Skinner issued a memorandum altering the 
method for making Transfer Requests. This had the effect of 
unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of 
employment. This constitutes an act of repudiation of the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement and the Board should 
therefore neither defer nor dismiss this charge. 
In an apparent misunderstanding of the Director's order, the Association argues to us 
that it was error for him to "defer" the dispute. It contends that OCA should not be 
permitted to "change the plain terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement with 
impunity, and face no statutory sanctions." OCA did not respond to the exceptions. 
Noting that PERB has jurisdiction over an alleged failure to continue terms and 
conditions of employment in an expired collective bargaining agreement, the 
'The Association does not take exception to the Director's decision to dismiss 
the alleged violation of §209-a.1(a). 
2See New York State Office of Court Admin., 32 PERB P063 (1999); City of 
Yonkers, 23 PERB ^[3055 (1990). 
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Association argues in support of its exceptions that the agreement "in effect between 
the [parties], sets forth specific procedures for transferring members of the Bargaining 
Unit from assignment to assignment had expired." [Emphasis added.] Whatever this 
statement may mean, the amended charge itself does not plead that the parties' 
agreementhas expired-Onthe-contraryrit pleads that the agreement is -''in-placedAn 
agreement that is alleged to be "in place" cannot, without more, be considered to be 
expired for purposes of the Act.3 Therefore, we find that the Director properly held that 
the amended charge alleges a breach of an existing agreement over which PERB does 
not have jurisdiction,4 not a failure to continue the terms of an expired agreement over 
which PERB has jurisdiction.5 
However, the Association emphasizes to us that the charge pleads a repudiation 
of the collective bargaining agreement, not merely a breach. It contends that OCA 
treated the at-issue contractual obligation as a nullity. Although we have held that the 
repudiation of an agreement may constitute a violation of §209-a.1 (d), the Association's 
amended charge pleads no facts from which to infer such a violation.6 PERB's Rules 
require a charging party to plead a clear and concise statement of the facts giving rise 
3See State of New York (SUNY Health Science Ctr. of Syracuse), 30 PERB 
1J3019, at 3042 (1997). 
4Act, §205.5(d). 
5Act, §209-a.1(e); State of New York (Office of Parks and Recreation), 27 PERB 
1J3001 (1992). 
6See Comsewogue Union Free Sch. Dist, 27 PERB 1J3047 (1994). 
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to the alleged violation.7 Although inferences may be drawn from pleaded facts, the 
Association's conclusory allegation that OCA repudiated the contract is not a sufficient 
factual basis to establish a repudiation of an agreement under PERB's jurisdiction. 
Therefore, we find that the Director properly concluded that the dispute, as pleaded, 
falls outside of our jurisdictions ^r^ ;—r—-
The Association's reliance on our decision in State of New York (SUNY Health 
Science Center of Syracuse), supra, is misplaced. There, PERB had jurisdiction over 
the dispute, not only because the parties' agreement had expired, but because the 
charging party also alleged facts to support an independent failure to negotiate in good 
faith. We declined to exercise our jurisdiction over the alleged failure to continue the 
terms of the expired agreement under our merits deferral policy, but we retained 
jurisdiction over the alleged independent failure to negotiate in good faith. In contrast, 
here the charge does not allege that the parties' agreement has expired,1 and it pleads 
no facts to establish an independent failure to negotiate in good faith. 
For the above reasons, the exceptions are denied, and the decision of the 
Director is affirmed. 
7Rules of Procedure §204.1 (b)(3). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge is dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: November 18, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Micha^J R. Cuevas, Chairman 
ott, Member 
kUck^Lpy 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
OF THE SYRACUSE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
for a determination pursuant to Section 212 
of the Civil Service Law CASE NO. S-0058 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On July 1, 1999,1 we ordered that a determination of this Board dated February 
8, 1968, approving the enactment establishing the Public Employment Relations Board 
of the Syracuse City School District (Syracuse PERB), be suspended, subject to 
reinstatement upon an application and demonstration by the Syracuse PERB that the 
continuing implementation of its local provisions and procedures is substantially 
equivalent to the implementation of the provisions and procedures of the Public 
Employees'Fair Employment Act (Act) by this Board. 
We also gave notice that unless such application was filed by August 2, 1999, 
that we would, without further notice, rescind, pursuant to §212 of the Act, our order 
dated February 8, 1968, approving the Syracuse City School District's local enactment 
and such other orders as approved amendments to, or the reinstatement of, its local 
32 PERB 1J3045 (1999). 
I 
J-
Board - S-0058 -2 
enactment, upon the ground that the continuing implementation of said local enactment 
and amendments thereof is no longer equivalent to the provisions and procedures that 
apply to and are implemented by this Board. 
The Syracuse PERB has filed no application for reinstatement. 
NOWrTREREFORErpuTsrar^^ 
February 8, 1968, approving the Syracuse City School District's local enactment and 
such other orders as approved amendments to, or the reinstatement of, its local 
enactment,2 upon the ground that the continuing implementation of said local 
enactment and amendments thereof is no longer equivalent to the provisions and 
procedures that.apply to and are implemented by this Board. 
DATED: November 18, 1999 
Albany, New York 
^(AAytcJ/U^JV'<^-^A 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
A/lafc A. Abbott, Memos 
J . 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
/ 
23 PERB 1J3008 (1970); 4 PERB P012 (1971); 4 PERB 1J3086 (1971); 6 PERB 
113010 (1973); 6 PERB 1J3061 (1973); 7 PERB 1J3063 (1974); an order dated March 3, 
1978; and 19 PERB 1J3078 (1986). 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
THOMAS J. SOULES, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4813 
WATERTOWN HOUSING AUTHORITY, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, j .-, 
Intervenor. 
THOMAS J. SOULES, pro se 
STEVEN G. MUNSON, ESQ., for Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL ORTIZ of counsel), 
for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On September 14, 1999, Thomas J. Soules filed a timely petition for 
decertification of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO (intervenor), the current negotiating representative for employees of the 
Watertown Housing Authority in the following unit: 
Included: All employees. 
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Excluded: Executive director, maintenance supervisor, tenant 
relations coordinator, modernization coordinator, 
principal account clerk and account clerk/typist. 
Upon consent of the parties, a mail ballot election was held on November 3, 
1999. The results of this election show that the majority of eligible employees in the 
unit whO-casLvalid^ballotsjo loncier desire to be represented for purposes of 
collective negotiations by the intervenor.1' 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the intervenor be, and it hereby is, 
decertified as the negotiating agent for the unit. 
DATED: November 18, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member' 
1
 Jbhn T. Mitchell, Member 
1/ Of the 12 ballots cast, 1 was for representation and 11 against 
representation. There were no challenged ballots. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JEFFREY INMAN, 
-and-
TOWN OF WHITESTOWN, 
-and-




CASE NO. C-4931 
JEFFREY INMAN, pro se 
LEROY C. KOTARY, for Employer 
JAMES CURTACCI, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On September 3, 1999, Jeffrey Inman filed a timely petition for decertification of 
CWA, Local 1126 (intervenor), the current negotiating representative for employees of 
the Town of Whitestown in the following unit: 
Included: Full-time and part-time working foreman, heavy equipment 
operator, motor equipment operator and laborer. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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Upon consent of the parties, a mail ballot election was held on November 1, 
1999. The results of this election show that the majority of eligible employees in the 
unit who cast valid ballots no longer desire to be represented for purposes of 
collective negotiations by theintervenor.^ 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the intervenor be, and it hereby is, 
decertified as the negotiating agent for the unit. 
DATED: November 18, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
JoftnjT. Mitchell, Member 
1/ Of the 16 ballots cast, 7 were for representation and 9 against 
representation. There were no challenged ballots. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF AUBURN ASSISTANT FIRE CHIEF'S 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4867 
CITY OF AUBURN, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
) Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the City of Auburn Assistant Fire Chiefs 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Included: Assistant Fire Chiefs, 
) Excluded: All other employees. 
) 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the City of Auburn Assistant Fire Chiefs Association. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 18, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ Marc A. Abbott, Member 
U^ye-'oc^<-X\ 
/' (John T. Mitchell, Member 
r 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4881 
FREEPORT UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
) A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: All full-time and part-time food service employees and security 
guards. 
Excluded: All other District employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
) either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 18, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
lvTarcA.7\bbott, Member 
UoHn T. Mitchell, Member 
i ' / 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 529, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASENO.C-4911 
TOWN OF WHEELER, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local Union 529 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All employees of the Town of Wheeler Highway Department. 
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Excluded: Confidential employees, managerial employees, temporary 
employees and elected officials. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local Union 529. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 18, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Merrib'er 
/Jdhn T. Mitchell, Member 
